long roots in the United States Supreme Court's own jurisprudence; 9 they draw analogies to judges' resort to academic literature, denying the binding force of the transnational; they suggest that it could do no harm and might illuminate the context of issues to understand what other democracies, or wise judges elsewhere, or international legal instruments with broad support have to say. As Ruth Bader Ginsburg J recently explained:
We refer to decisions rendered abroad, it bears repetition, not as controlling authorities, but for their indication … of 'common denominators of basic fairness governing relationships between the governors and the governed.' 10 On two points in this debate one might find considerable agreement: there are large common denominators and there is an enormous amount of transnational material that poses real challenges of proper understanding and appropriate usage. The transnational legal environment of today, compared with 50 or 100 years ago, is characterised by the existence of vastly more international law, concerning a far larger arena of topics, including many human rights issues that are also typically addressed by domestic constitutional law. 11 There is also more constitutional law than 100 or even 50 years ago -there are both more national states and increased resort to written constitutions or quasi-constitutional legal instruments. 12 Because of the influence of human rights instruments at the international and regional levels, and the influence of pre-existing constitutions on those international instruments, there is now considerable overlap in the concepts and language of many of these national constitutions.
These many bodies of international and foreign law are also now more accessible than ever before. And this fact, in a sense, forces a choice upon constitutional interpreters. The option of a certain kind of insularity -of being ignorant of transnational public law developments -is diminishing. National courts are increasingly being asked to consider transnational law and, thus, have to take positions on the relevance of foreign and international law in domestic constitutional adjudication.
As noted, this paper has two goals: first, it argues that, as a positive matter, courts around the world have taken at least three different postures towards these transnational sources -postures of convergence with the transnational, postures of resistance to transnational influence and postures of engagement with transnational sources. Second, the paper seeks to explore, in a very preliminary way, the relationship of these postures to interpretive theory and the role of constitutions, and in doing so to _____________________________________________________________________________________ 9 See, eg, Ginsburg, above n 5. suggest why -at least for some countries, including the United States -a posture of engagement may be a better fit than one of resistance or convergence.
I CONVERGENCE, RESISTANCE, ENGAGEMENT
A brief sketch of these three postures, their various forms, justifications, and motivations, is provided below.
Convergence: Some courts seem to favour constitutional interpretations that converge either with international law or with emerging transnational consensus or 'best practices' among constitutional courts as to reasoning or result. As will be shown, this does not all come from courts' initiative: some constitutional convergence may be authorised or required by constitutional texts. And in some cases convergence may result from influences exogenous to law or the postures of the courts.
Some post-World War II national constitutions incorporate international law -or some parts of international law -as superior to statutes. So, for example, in Germany, The Basic Law provides that '[t]he general rules of public international law … take precedence over statutes and directly create rights and duties for' individuals, 13 although in practice this provision is given a somewhat restrictive meaning. 14 Article 7 of the Costa Rica Constitution likewise provides, ' [p]ublic treaties, international agreements and concordats duly approved by the Legislative Assembly shall have a higher authority than' statutes. 15 In these countries, by virtue of the constitution, international law functions -like constitutional law -to trump contrary statutes. 16 Outside of Europe and the force of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, at least one national constitution -the 1994 Constitution of Argentina 17 -specifically incorporates a number of human rights instruments as 15 See Constitution of Costa Rica art 7 (emphasis added) (English translation available at <http://www.costarica.com/Culture/Costa-Rica-Constitution/Title-1.-The-Republic> at 20 August 2007). 16 Convergence is not necessarily limited to domestic review under national constitutions. There is at least one country in Europe, Switzerland, which does not have formal judicial review of national statutes under its domestic constitution, but whose court gives effect to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms over national statutes in considering human rights claims (for example, involving extradition 25 And the 1991 Constitution of Colombia provides that the rights set forth therein should be interpreted consistently with those international human rights treaties which Colombia has ratified. 26 Even without such explicit constitutional mandates, national courts sometimes have expressed a sense of obligation to construe their domestic laws in accordance with international human rights law and the principles of the United Nations. In Unity Dow v Attorney General in Botswana, different judges referred to international instruments to construe an ambiguous equality provision to prohibit gender discrimination in the capacity of mothers and fathers to pass on citizenship to their children: one judge wrote, 'I bear in mind that signing the Convention does not give it the power of law in Botswana but the effect of the adherence by Botswana to the Convention must show that a construction' of section 15 should extend, 'in harmony with the convention' to ban sex discrimination. 27 Similarly, in Vishaka v Rajasthan, 28 the Indian Supreme Court construed the national Constitution in light of the principles of a ratified, but not yet implemented international convention, to require the government to act against sexual harassment and rape, writing that the international convention 'must be read into' the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution 'to enlarge [their] meaning.' 29 National governments' signings of human rights treaties were thus invoked by courts in support of an interpretive presumption on questions of constitutional law. Where the Constitution is ambiguous, this Court should adopt that meaning which conforms to the principles of universal and fundamental rights rather than an interpretation that would involve a departure from such rights. 30 This position is an extension of the interpretive canon that statutes be construed, to the extent that their language permits, to be consistent rather than inconsistent with international law; 31 in Coleman v Power, 32 where a protester against police corruption was arrested and convicted, under a statute banning insulting words in public, Kirby J read the statute -in light of both the Australian implied constitutional right of political communication as well as international law -not to apply in the absence of a threat to the peace. 33 Significantly, in his opinions (and in opinions by other judges in other countries), we see the idea that in interpreting national constitutions, as well as sub-constitutional law, courts should work towards achieving the goals of these human rights instruments. 34 Aspirations towards convergence or harmonisation of national constitutions with the protection of basic human rights reflect the influence of international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and their normative underpinnings -including a commitment to universal human dignity and to the use of law to prevent the grotesque barbarities of which modern history shows governments are capable. These 'cosmopolitan' arguments for convergence are also related to the normative value of international law and the stake national legal systems are believed to have in the development and support of international law. 35 While this normatively cosmopolitan version of convergence may be used to signal and enforce a break from authoritarian or racist past regimes, we should also recognise that some convergences in constitutional texts or judicial opinions may be less related to deep normative commitment to human rights and more the product of the influence of human rights instruments as legally available forms, as constitutional archetypes, something a constitution must have regardless of how well understood or deeply committed the polity may be to their substance. Be that as it may, a somewhat different idea of convergence consists of a blend of functionalism and progressivism -the idea that when many countries' legal decisions tend to converge, it is likely that they have produced a better answer to a common problem. Jeremy Waldron analogised decentralised processes of convergence to an 'established body of scientific findings', suggesting that a legal consensus that emerges from many countries deliberating over a common problem represents an 'accumulated legal wisdom'. 36 Relying on a decentralised search for best answers assumes a degree of functional commonality and implies that once a trend or consensus emerges among different courts addressing the same issue, it is sensible for other courts to give some weight to their result. So, blending these approaches, David Beatty has argued both that most courts use the idea of proportionality as 'the ultimate rule of law' in measuring the constitutionality of government action and that it is the best measure of constitutional justice as a normative matter. 37 Convergence might also result from some transnational understanding of the role of judges. If the central figure is the judge, not the national constitution, and if the judge's expert role is a universalised one of protecting minority or other human rights, then one might expect a transnational community of judges to converge on 'best practices' answers to common problems. 38 Influences towards convergence may also arise from institutional similarities in the position of constitutional court judges who, regardless of their normative stance on human rights, are engaged in a common enterprise of constitutional adjudication. As David Law has suggested, 39 this enterprise places constitutional court judges in the similar but challenging position of having to justify either their invalidation of government action or their rejection of individual claims of right, inviting common modes of reasoning and discourse.
And finally, economic and political incentives may operate to push countries to converge on particular constitutional positions that more powerful nations or supranational bodies require as a condition for membership, or for other rewards. The 
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Volume 35 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Hungarian Constitutional Court's very first decision, in 1990, invalidating the death penalty, was made both for reasons of principle and, according to many observers, with an eye on Hungary's potential membership in the European Union. 40 Thus, convergence may be understood in several ways -as a normative posture in constitutions and courts, or as a quasi-normative, quasi-functional mode. It may arise from normative theory, from institutional factors (relating to the role of courts and judges) and from exogenous forces (of political economy) pushing in this direction.
Resistance: The transnational forces that tend to produce convergence, however, may also provoke a very different posture, a posture of resistance or indifference to foreign or international law, even as 'persuasive authority'. In the United States, strong arguments are made that, except in narrowly defined circumstances (involving, for example, transnational law that existed at the time of constitution-making that sheds light on original meanings), these sources are irrelevant to constitutional interpretation. As mentioned, this posture is prominently associated in the United States with the position of Scalia J. In 2005, the United States Supreme Court in Roper v Simmons held that the execution of a defendant convicted of capital murder committed before the defendant was 18 violated the 'evolving standards of decency' embodied in the Eighth Amendment's ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments, departing from a decision made 16 years earlier rejecting the same constitutional challenge. 41 Dissenting from and criticising the majority opinion, Scalia J wrote, '[t]hough the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court's decision today, the views of other countries and the so-called international community take center stage', invoking arguments from democracy. 42 For Scalia J, democratic governance could be reconciled with an 'evolving standards' test only by hewing to 'objective criteria' of the laws and practices of the US States. However, he claimed, '[t]he basic premise of this Court's argument', was 'that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world ... ', a proposition, he says, that 'should be rejected out of hand'. 43 The laws of many other countries differ dramatically -the United States is unique in its exclusionary rule, its separation of church and state, and close to unique in the liberality of its abortion jurisprudence, he argued, but the Court did not consider transnational legal sources in an across the board way in resolving those constitutional issues, raising concerns about unprincipled discretion to consider foreign law only when it supports one's views. 44 On the other hand, Kirby J, like Scalia J, has sought to articulate a principled position that constrains judging -for Kirby J it is that, in all cases involving ambiguous interpretive questions, the Constitution should be construed in accord with international human rights law to the extent that a rule exists; 47 Scalia J argues for a principled and constraining position that contemporary foreign and international law are irrelevant. So in a sense, convergence and resistance -as favoured postures -are mirror images of each other.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Examples of resistance can be found in a number of opinions in the United States. Thus, for example, the Court in 1989 wrote 'it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive', rejecting the relevance of world practice or opinion on the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. 48 In his opinion for the Court in a federalism case, 49 Scalia J wrote that comparative constitutional knowledge was relevant in writing, but not interpreting a constitution. 50 Going back to the 19 th Century, when the majority relied on assertions about the powers of sovereigns in the world community as justifying plenary control over immigration (including the power to exclude based on race or national origin), the dissenters wrote, passionately, that the United States 'takes nothing from the usages or the former action of European governments'. 51 Moving out of the United States, it is worth noting that just as constitutional texts themselves can lay down a positive basis for postures of convergence, so too, can constitutional texts lay an explicit foundation for resistance to the transnational, There is some ambiguity in Kirby J's position, as to whether it is only international human rights law or international law more generally that should presumptively influence the interpretation of domestic law. See Kirby, above n 30, 347-8: referring both to 'international law' and 'international human rights law'. especially in the economic sphere. Mexico's Constitution has a 'Calvo' clause, intended to disable foreign parties from relying on their foreign status to interfere with domestic decisions about property interests. 52 In the Philippines, the Supreme Court, relying on its constitutional provisions reserving control of natural resources to the government, found a statute authorising a service contract for the management of mining production unconstitutional; it later reversed itself. 53 On Professor David Schneiderman's account, many of these constitutional resistances to globalised free trade norms are unsuccessful over the long term, yet as a study of the Hungarian court's decision striking down of IMF-inspired welfare reform has suggested, reliance on national constitutions to resist pressures of international economic development may restructure debate and decision-making in significant ways. 54 So constitutional resistance should not necessarily be associated only with the views of some United States jurists. Nonetheless, the willingness of the United States Court to resist is notable, though as a major power perhaps not surprising. Last Term the Supreme Court of the United States declined to interpret United States obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in accordance with the views of the International Court of Justice ('ICJ'). 55 Defendants in serious criminal cases had not received notification that they could seek assistance from their consuls, as required by the Vienna Convention. In at least one case, serious prejudice assertedly resulted, but relief in the lower courts was denied. The ICJ had previously held, in other cases brought against the United States (in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals 56 and LaGrand 57 ), that the 'full effects' provision of article 36 of the Consular Convention in some circumstances required judicial re-consideration of the violations. The United States Court disagreed, and rejected arguments that, because the United States was a party to the Convention and (at the time of the ICJ decisions) to its Optional Protocol, it was bound to follow the ICJ holding, in part because Article III of the United States Constitution vests judicial power in the Supreme Court, a power that extends to having the final word on the interpretation of United States treaties. 58 So we see a number of examples of resistance, based on a sense of national sovereignty -over resources, over law -embodied in constitutional interpretations.
Engagement: Under the third model, engagement, a judge is not resistant in principle to considering international or foreign law. But neither does she necessarily presume in favour of interpreting the constitution in accord with evolving transnational standards. The engagement model values the insights of foreign and international law, but without necessarily placing a thumb on the scale in any one direction. 59 An example already mentioned is Coleman, where Kirby J relied on the ICCPR, as well as constitutional and common law principles, to give a narrow construction of the statute as not reaching conduct not likely to provoke a violent reaction. 60 Gummow
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S Ct 2669, 2684-5 (2006). The Court also relied on the fact that, under the ICJ statute, the ICJ's decisions are not even binding on the ICJ in another case: at 2684; Cf ibid 2700 (Breyer J dissenting). As Rosalind Dixon has pointed out in email correspondence with the author, there is in principle a distinction between resistance to international law as such and disagreement with particular interpretations or the role of particular institutions. Although much of the Court's analysis in Sanchez-Llamas is based on the latter kind of disagreement, some of the resistance to the asserted role of the ICJ is based on the ground that the international tribunal's judgment as to the treaty obligation of the United States may not be treated as binding the federal courts because, under the US Constitution, the federal courts are to have the final word as to the meaning of treaties: at 2684-5. The opinion, however, arguably leaves open the possibility that a treaty could provide for the binding force of an international tribunal's judgments, by concluding that this treaty had not clearly enough done so: see at 2684 ('Nothing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts.') 59 See Jenny S Martinez, 'Towards an International Judicial System' (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 429, 461-77. Martinez argues for an 'anti-parochialism' canon, rejecting 'the two dominant paradigms of relationships between international institutions and national institutions -the internationalist dream of hierarchical enforcement of international rules and the nationalist fetish of complete sovereign independence', in favour of a 'third possibility, one of overlapping jurisdiction that leads, yes, sometimes to conflict and indeterminacy, but also to jurisgenerative dialogue': at 466. 64 where the High Court initially developed the implied freedom of political communication and its implications for common law defencesthat references to foreign law were predominantly 'dialogic'. 65 Another example of engagement can be found in the Canadian opinions, majority and dissent, in R v Keegstra, 66 a case narrowly upholding a ban on willfully promoting hatred of groups through public speech. The majority spent considerable time laying out the strands of United States case law, and explaining why, if United States case law did prohibit government bans on hate speech, the Canadian constitutional context differed in its commitments to multiculturalism and equality, and required a different result. The dissenters also discussed the United States case law, arguing that Canadian . At issue in Coleman was a challenge to a conviction of violating a statute prohibiting the use of insulting language to another person in a public place, applied to a protester who vociferously and insultingly argued that the police in general, and one particular police officer in particular, were corrupt. The Court, dividing 4:3, struck down the conviction, though on different rationales. The disagreement over the statute is whether it can be read, as, for example, Gummow and Hayne JJ do, to be limited to words likely to provoke a breach of the peace, or whether the statute's having been changed from an earlier version to omit that requirement rules out such an interpretation, as per McHugh J. Gummow and Hayne JJ offered four reasons to narrowly construe the statute: 'first, that the section creates an offence; secondly, the description of the words as ''insulting''; thirdly, the requirement that the words are used to a person; and fourthly, the requirement that the words are used in, or within the hearing of, a public place': at 74. It is in connection with the first of these that the US case law was invoked. Kirby J relied in part on the ICCPR to support a narrow interpretation of the statute, while Gleeson CJ disagreed, arguing against reliance on the ICCPR in interpreting a statute which predated it: at 91-8 (Kirby J); 26-30 (Gleeson CJ). experience under the very statute in question confirmed the insight of the United States case law that the balance of harmful and good effects from restraints on speech, in their actual applications, was in the negative. 67 There is yet another, stronger version of engagement, embodied in the South African Constitution's directive that the courts must consider international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights. 68 This provision does not specify the hierarchical status of international law, but it creates an obligation to consider international law. This obligation to consider may be contrasted with the presumption the South African Constitution requires to interpret statutes in accord with international law, 69 and also with the explicit constitutional license, but not mandate, to consider foreign law in deciding constitutional questions. 70 So, on this model, there is a normative obligation to consider but not necessarily to converge with international law, and an authority to consider foreign law.
In S v Makwanyane, a 1995 case, the new South African Constitutional Court held the death penalty unconstitutional under the Interim Constitution. 71 At this time, as Chief Judge Chaskalson noted, the world was fairly evenly split among so-called retentionist and nonretentionist jurisdictions. 72 He found the reasons and judgments of 'international and foreign authorities … [to be] of value because they analyse arguments for and against the death sentence and show how courts of other jurisdictions have dealt with this vexed issue', a reason at the core of a deliberative model of engagement. He went on to say that such sources may 'have to be considered because' the Interim Constitution required that '[i]n interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall … where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the right entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law'. 73 Concluding that capital punishment, unlike torture, was not 'absolutely prohibited' by international law, 74 he found himself more persuaded, for example, by the dissenting than the majority views in the United States case law, especially in the context of the transformational goals of South Africa's new Constitution. 75 
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Volume 35 ____________________________________________________________________________________ As a final example of engagement, consider the United States Supreme Court decision in Roper. 77 Contrary to Justice Scalia's suggestion that the majority sought to converge with world opinion, it is evident that foreign and international law were looked to, not as binding sources of authority, but as confirming a conclusion the Court had reached based on its analysis of domestic law and precedents. By way of background, Roper overruled, by a 5:4 vote, an earlier and equally close decision, Stanford, 78 which had upheld capital punishment for persons aged 16 or 17 at the time of the offence. Critics accuse the Roper Court of being lawless and political, of either using transnational law as a fig leaf to cover their personal preference or of being too much under the sway of foreign opinions and international law. These critiques fly in the face of what the majority said about the influence of foreign and international law and the structure of the opinion itself.
First, under established United States doctrine, the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit only those punishments regarded as 'cruel and unusual' in 1791, but also bars those punishments which come to be so regarded. A punishment could become cruel and unusual if there was a trend and consensus against its use in the State legislatures and in practice, both of which, the Court found, existed with respect to imposition of the death penalty for offences committed before the defendant was 18. 79 (Although more States prohibited the juvenile death penalty than had done so at the time of Stanford, 80 the Roper Court departed from the prior decision's controversial exclusion of States prohibiting all forms of the death penalty in determining what the dominant view of the States was). Second, the Court considered data about the capacities of adolescents; their greater capacity to be influenced, their lower maturity, and the possibility of their personality or character changing over time, finding that these characteristics distinguished them from adults in meriting the death penalty. 81 Third, the Court surveyed the use of different age limits by the States for a variety of responsibilities and rights, finding that 18 was predominantly used to demarcate the age of responsibility from the age of lesser responsibility. 82 Court made its own independent assessment of whether imposition of the penalty was cruel and unusual as applied to adolescent offenders, concluding that it was. 83 Finally, the Court considered foreign and international law, which provided 'confirmation' of its conclusions drawn from internal sources, by the overwhelming consensus in law and the abandonment in practice of imposing the death penalty on those under 18 84 -a consensus which distinguishes this issue from many other issues on which foreign or international law might be thought relevant. But the Court's treatment of this point was one of engagement and consideration, not one which placed primary import on the transnational consensus or treated it as binding.
Engagement itself has at least two modes, associated with different justifications and functions for engagement, and analysis here owes a debt to ongoing work by Rosalind Dixon for help in clarifying these modes. 85 In the one mode, which might be called deliberation-enhancing engagement, the focus is primarily on the degree to which considering international or foreign material can aid the judge in a deeper, or better, appreciation of her own constitution and in attaining that distance from her own situation which may promote more impartial decision-making. Engagement may involve consideration of both similar and distinctive constitutional practices. In this mode there is truly no 'thumb on the scale,' and international law (especially international law not yet binding on the country by virtue of its own domestic mechanisms) is considered almost as a form of comparative law, rather than as having a one-way influence on the direction of domestic law.
A second mode of engagement is connected to some of the same impulses behind what might be called cosmopolitan convergence, but with a greater emphasis on process than substance. What is important here is that foreign and especially relevant international law must be considered, though not necessarily followed. On this view, elsewhere described as recognising the 'relational authority' of foreign courts' decisions Roper, 543 US 551, 575-7 (2005) . O'Connor J, dissenting, disagreed with the conclusion, arguing that American trial procedures could effectively distinguish those adolescents capable of having the kind of extraordinary culpability which under US case law warrants imposition of the death penalty from those who did not: at 601-04, 606. The majority argued in response that because so very few adolescents, if any, would possess that degree of culpability, the risk of error by trial courts and juries was unacceptably high given the heinousness of the offences: at 572-4. O'Connor J defended the Court's consideration of foreign and international law in principle, but absent a greater or more settled consensus within the United States, she could not join the majority conclusions: at 604-05. on issues of domestic constitutional law, 86 foreign and international law, especially on human rights, have a decided gravitational pull, if they concern parallel commitments and decisions and especially if they represent a consensus or decisive trend. This pull (whose bases are too complex for analysis here) demands consideration, though not necessarily convergence.
Some caveats are now in order. First, analysis thus far has primarily concerned courts' attitudes, which are only one of the factors influencing the direction of the law: there may be convergences of law in some areas, not because of courts' decisions, but as a result of other forces. Second, courts may be influenced by other courts or international law in what Judith Resnik has termed a 'silent dialogue', 87 so that there may be convergences (or resistances) that are motivated by comparative judgments though not explained in those terms. Third, legal practice on the ground may differ greatly even when judges articulate similar legal norms. Fourth, different considerations may apply to referring to foreign law, on the one hand, and international law, on the other, in constitutional interpretation. 88 Fifth, although these three categories -of convergence, resistance and engagement -are a useful way of understanding what is happening, they are necessarily broad, and do not capture all the nuances that exist; one can find multiple postures running through the jurisprudence of the same court, or even at times of the same judge. Actual positions of courts, and justices, are often more subtle than any overarching effort at categorisation can capture. For example, as noted earlier, Kirby J's position is not one for convergence in all circumstances, but only where the domestic interpretive issue is fairly described as open and there is a clear rule of international law. 89 Scalia J has on occasion considered foreign legal experience in constitutional adjudication. 90 So while categorisation is useful, it is likely to be something of an overstatement to say that this court or that tends to the convergence or engagement or resistance mode, or to try to categorise any judge's opinions under a one word banner.
A final caveat: the modes of convergence, resistance, and engagement are what might be called 'postures', which are not the same as interpretive theories, nor are they the same as the different kinds of functional uses that may be made of foreign and international law, though they may be associated in some ways with some of them. 91 As a matter of interpretive theory, for example, positivism might underlie both postures of convergence (as in Argentina, whose Constitution incorporates several human rights Rather, these categories -of convergence, resistance and engagement -are helpful in identifying a more general attitude towards the use of transnational sources in domestic adjudication. With these caveats in mind, the next section goes on to discuss the appeal of a posture of engagement.
II ENGAGEMENT DEFENDED
What is the benefit to judges and lawyers of engaging with foreign or international law in constitutional interpretation? The answers to this question may seem self-evident, but at least in the United States it is a live question, to be briefly addressed here. First, with respect to international law that has become binding on a country, if an interpretation of the constitution would put the country in violation of its international obligations, or even if the interpretation would merely make it more difficult to comply, it seems only sensible for judges to be aware of such consequences and consider alternative interpretations. One of the many purposes of a constitution is to enable a country to make and fulfil international commitments, and it is consistent with this purpose to be concerned about the relationship between constitutional interpretation and binding international agreements. While on a model of convergence a strong presumption would apply to interpret the constitution in a manner consistent with international legal obligations, 92 on an engagement model what is required is serious consideration. In such consideration, the manner by which an international obligation is formed or assumed might bear on its weight. 93 _____________________________________________________________________________________ treaties as of constitutional stature and thus requires looking to those instruments in domestic constitutional adjudication) and postures of resistance (as for those in the United States who believe that (a) originalist understandings must control constitutional interpretation and (b) that orginalist understandings preclude resort to contemporary foreign or international law). As a matter of functional uses, some have argued that foreign law may be considered as a reason to uphold, but not strike down, a statute: see, eg, Mary Ann Glendon, 'Judicial Tourism', Wall Street Journal (New York), 16 September 2005, A14, thereby suggesting a posture of qualified resistance to the use of foreign law except for the specific function indicated.
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There is arguably a distinction between interpreting a constitution, on the one hand, so as not itself to violate international law and, on the other hand, so as to be consistent with international law. See, eg, Martin Flaherty, 'Judicial Globalization in the Service of SelfGovernment' (2006) 20 Ethics and International Affairs 477, 480, 493, 495-9. When an action is prohibited by international law, interpreting a domestic constitution to take no position on the legality of the act is, arguably, not itself in violation of international law if ordinary legislation could be adopted under that constitution to prohibit the act. Convergence models, however, tend to support a presumption of consistency in constitutional interpretation.
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For example, in the United States, the Senate must give its consent to treaties signed by the President in order for them to be enacted as 'treaties', and thus part of 'supreme' federal law: US Constitution art II, § 2, art VI; a treaty so ratified might be thought to bear some presumption of constitutionality arguably greater than unimplemented treaties in those countries in which the government alone can make binding agreements. In Australia, the government alone can make treaties; as a formal matter it is a 'dualist' country, meaning that treaties made by the government 'do not form part of Australian law unless those provisions have been validly incorporated into domestic law by statute': Joint Statement, The Minister for Foreign Affairs together with the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, 'The Effect of Treaties in Administrative Decision Making' (Press Release, 25
In the United States, however, much of the controversy over international law has arisen not with respect to international law that is clearly binding, but with respect to conventions the United States has not signed, or has taken reservations to, or where the United States has 'persistently objected' in an effort to prevent customary international law from binding the United States. 94 Scalia J was particularly critical of the majority in Roper for referring to international conventions that the United States had not ratified or had reserved on the juvenile death penalty. 95 Yet these formal constitutional differences may be misleading: if, for example, '[a]s a general policy, the necessary legislation is put in place prior to the entry into force of a treaty for Australia', (as Jennings above suggests), both executive and legislative components would have 'spoken' to the issue and perhaps more clearly than in the US model, in which the consent of only the Senate is sufficient. Other complications -for example, the US doctrine of 'non-self-executing treaties', under which only some treaties have domestic legal effect in court without implementing legislation, or the controversy in Australia over the effects of unimplemented treaties on interpreting the law, see Joint Statement above (seeking to clarify that mere entry into a treaty by the government does not give rise to a 'legitimate expectation' that should influence administrative practice, contra to Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273) -would need to be addressed in a more complete comparative analysis than is possible here. agreeing that the unimplemented convention may have force on ambiguous statutory issues but denying that it supports reliance on the doctrine of legitimate expectations in this case. Apart from being mindful of whether interpretations would place its country in violation of international obligations, there are other benefits to a court, deciding a constitutional question, in considering transnational legal sources. First, there may be functional similarities between the legal terms of or the legal values protected by different constitutions. Parallel provisions, such as freedom of expression, or nondiscrimination, are likely to give rise to similar kinds of challenges. Thus, courts may find it helpful to read other courts' opinions, not necessarily to 'receive' or 'borrow' solutions, but rather to test out ones supported by their own domestic traditions against others' experiences and reasoning. Constitutions that have some historical connection to another country's law may benefit from looking not only for 'originalist' understandings but to see how law from a common root has developed -again, not for the purpose of copying but for testing a judge's understanding of what the law has come to mean in her own jurisdiction. Looking outside may also offer different -but interpretively plausible -ways of approaching a problem shared by others.
Second, engagement with foreign law and experience can be helpful in a negative way -by ruling out interpretive choices that have worked poorly in analogous countries. Thus, Justice Robert Jackson in his famous opinion in the Youngstown Steel case in the United States, referred in some depth to the constitutional experiences of Weimar Germany, the Third French Republic and Britain, reasoning that it would be too dangerous to recognise emergency powers in a president who could himself declare the state of emergency. 97 The adverse consequences of the Weimar Constitution's authorisation to the President to declare an emergency was an object lesson, a 'negative' or, in Kim Scheppele's words, 'aversive' precedent. 98 Third, some constitutional texts may invite their interpreters to consider a range of practices, especially those texts embodying widely shared norms. Canada's requirement that legislative limits on rights protected by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms be 'demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society' is arguably an invitation to compare with other free and democratic societies. 99 Other constitutional language -'cruel and unusual punishments', or 'unreasonable' searches or seizures in the United States Constitution's Eighth and Fourth Amendments, respectively -might likewise invite comparison. Indeed, notwithstanding recent controversy, the United States Court from its very first Eighth Amendment case in 1879 has considered practices in other countries in assessing claims that a particular punishment is banned as cruel and unusual. 100 brief relied on experience in other countries to persuade the Court to uphold protective legislation for female workers as reasonable. 101 On this account, though, the challenge remains to determine what countries are comparable and for what purposes. In Roper, Scalia J was particularly critical of the majority's reliance on English law, finding it 'beyond comprehension' 102 -the United Kingdom had joined the European Convention and its law had developed quite differently from the US, he argued. But since the root of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment was the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, the majority not unreasonably disagreed. But other comparisons, including, for example, Breyer J's reference to European federalisms in Printz v United States, 103 raise harder questions.
More generally, the constitutional practices of other nations can provide normative insight into how one's own should be construed. This normative insight may come from a consensus; it may come from a particularly persuasive comparison; a singularly wise judicial opinion; or a powerful negative example. Transnational sources can be interlocutors, testing understanding of one's own traditions by examining them in the reflection of others. In Miranda v Arizona, 104 an iconic case requiring that certain warnings be given to suspects before custodial interrogations, the Court described in detail the practices in several foreign countries 105 and then commented that if England, Scotland, Ceylon and India provided protection in custodial interrogations, the United States Constitution should do 'at least' as well. 106 A comparative perspective can hold up a helpful mirror to a nation's deepest commitments, or better nature: consider Plessy v Ferguson, 107 which upheld racial segregation and stood for almost 60 years until Brown v Board of Education held otherwise. 108 In the former case, the lone dissenter, Harlan J, remarked that Americans liked to 'boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples', but would not live up to that boast if racial segregation were upheld. 109 Finally, and relatedly, comparative knowledge may enhance judges' capacities and abilities for impartial judging. By providing means to engage in imagined dialogue with comparably situated judges whose decisions carry a similar weight and gravity in another country, judges -who may be ethically prohibited from actually discussing pending cases outside the court -can still benefit from alternative perspectives on a problem in ways that can provide critical distance and thus improve their own decision-making.
These benefits of considering transnational legal sources in the mode of 'deliberative engagement' are functional, expressive and ethical. They are functional to the extent that comparison may heighten a judge's ability to understand, in her own system, the function of judging and the function of a particular constitutional commitment. They are expressive to the extent that comparison may aid a judge in determining whether her constitutional system expresses values that are shared, or not, with others. And they are ethical in that engaging with the work of other courts may help a judge come closer to that degree of impartiality that norms of judging aspire to.
These are by no means the only reasons to engage. The countries of the world are increasingly connected, and what happens in one is increasingly likely to have effects on citizens of others; reasons of normative concern for all peoples, and enlightened self interest on behalf of one's own country may all support postures of engagement. The reasons for engagement are a starting point for rejecting a general posture of resistance. How, though, does engagement with transnational sources fit with broader questions of interpretive theory?
III ENGAGEMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
As noted, many originalists would oppose much use of international or foreign law, though they might approve the use of contemporary international law to interpret terms, like 'treaty' or 'war', intended to work reciprocally with other nations' understandings. 110 Originalism, as an interpretive theory, has been much debated in Australia and in the United States. Although space does not permit a full-fledged argument here, originalism, narrowly understood, is not sufficient for a working constitutional theory in a country like the United States. First, all but the most devout originalists allow room for the operation of stare decisis and having done so, the question whether to adhere to, expand on, or overrule a prior decision may well be informed by the experience of other countries and by international legal norms. Second, those originalists who adhere to what Professor Goldsworthy calls 'enactment' intentions, rather than 'application' intentions, might also find room to learn from other countries' experiences in deciding how to apply 'enactment' intentions to contemporary issues. 111 Third, a constitution that has stood over a long period of time and has come to function -in part through transnational social movements -for a more inclusive body politic than its drafters and ratifiers envisioned, may well need to be interpreted in light of a broader range of sources in order to give effect to its meaning in that more inclusive polity. Two major concerns are for democratic legitimacy and judicial constraint. The concern for democratic legitimacy raised by originalists turns out to be very complicated. It is one thing to say that a polity that votes to entrench a constitution should be bound by it and that courts, enforcing the bargain as it was understood soon after its enactment, are acting consistently with democracy. But it is quite another matter to say so with respect to a text adopted a hundred years or more earlier, without the participation of major elements of the adult community, as is the case in both the United States and Australia. To say that democracy requires the court to give effect to the document only as it was understood at the time of enactment -especially to invalidate laws enacted by today's more inclusive majorities 112 -is not a proposition that flows uncontrovertibly from commitments to democratic decisionmaking. 113 While rule of law values support treating the text as binding, that is a different matter from saying that specific original understandings of that text are binding as well. Engagement with the transnational as non-binding sources, properly and fairly considered, can also be reconciled with appropriate levels of judicial constraint. 114 The harder question, then, may be, why not convergence? This question cannot be answered without saying something more about interpretive theory and the very concept of a constitution, as well as recognising the possibility of differences among countries.
Apart from originalism, another set of interpretive theories are purposive -they focus on a particular large purpose, or set of purposes, in whose light constitutional interpretation should proceed -for John Hart Ely, 'representation-reinforcement', 115 for Stephen Breyer, 'active liberty', 116 and so forth. But most judges in the United States do not have unified, purposive constitutional theories, but rather are situated in what one might call a common law method of constitutional interpretation. What is meant by this -which may differ from how the phrase is used in Australia -is a method of decision-making bounded by the text, and informed by its original purpose and structure, but also powerfully influenced by past precedents and history and open to considering changing understandings and changing factual settings. 117 On this model, how to interpret a clause, or implement a shared value, can be re-considered, and if the reasons for change are compelling enough, stare decisis can give way to better doctrine. 118 This common law method of constitutional interpretation has much to commend it as a theory. First, it corresponds with actual practice and is thus more likely to be useful. Second, it functions to link present generations with their past, while providing the stability and flexibility that make constitutions work over time. It also promotes a certain humility in decision-makers -generally constrained by the wisdom of past decision-makers but open to the possibility of better understandings. 119 Finally, by providing multiple avenues for argument and contest it, in effect, makes the process of determining constitutional meaning more inclusive. 120 This common law view of constitutional interpretation is incompatible with those versions of originalism that animate much resistance to the transnational in the United States. 121 But it may also be less than fully compatible with postures of convergenceand whether this is so may depend on the particular constitution. Here are some reasons why.
First, in common law constitutional decision-making text matters. A constitution like that of Argentina is thus different from that of the United States, in that one has a constitutional directive to treat human rights agreements as of constitutional stature, the other does not. The positivity and specificity of textual authorisation to treat international law as presumptively binding, then, might make a difference.
Moreover, constitutions that last are typically negotiated by contending political forces; compromise is, in a sense, a hallmark of successful constitutional politicsenforcing, or living with foundational compromises may be necessary, even if they become inconsistent with evolving norms. Examples of this might include the United States rule of two Senators for each State -two for California with its 36.5 million people and two for Wyoming with its 500 000 people 122 -or Canada's limitation of constitutionally required public support to only certain Christian denominational schools. 123 Third, constitutions are typically concerned with institutional allocations of authority, for example, as between courts, legislatures and governments. Legislatures and governments may have a role to play in giving meaning to constitutional texts, and these may vary from one polity to another. 124 This may be an aspect of what Gerald Neuman has referred to as the institutionally specific character of seemingly parallel rights. 125 Fourth, national constitutions are often closely bound up with national identity. Where national identity itself is founded on cosmopolitan commitments, convergence is more plausible. But the United States, perhaps unlike Australia, has been hesitant on human rights issues to make binding commitments to international treaties. What Professor Louis Henkin called the 'Ghost of the Bricker amendment' lives on. 126 The Bricker amendment, which came close to passage in Congress in the early 1950s, would have denied or limited treaties' domestic effect and was motivated, in part, by a fear that the United Nations Charter would be invoked to support a federal antilynching bill. Although the amendment failed, part of the informal agreement reached between the President at the time and congressional leaders was that no human rights covenants would be brought forward for ratification -and none were for many years. United States national identity is tied up with its Constitution and, at least at times, to its being both a leader and a loner.
National constitutions necessarily have multiple and, at times, competing functions and goals, which must be considered in evaluating interpretive approaches in general and the appropriate posture to take with respect to foreign and international law. These multiple functions may be incompatible with single-valenced interpretive theories and may also be inconsistent with strong postures, either of resistance to, or convergence with transnational law, foreign or international. These functions, and their interpretive implications, can only be sketched here.
What is distinctive about constitutions? First, they are regarded as a form of national self-expression, far more so than, say, the law of contracts. 127 Second, they have broad subject matters, serving a variety of internal and external functionsproviding for the national defence and foreign relations; specifying frameworks for elections, and rules for internal governance and intergovernmental relationships; identifying rights to protect fundamental individual and collective interests; stating rules, powers and rights to provide a legal regime to promote material prosperity; confirming and embodying foundational compromises. Third, they are typically entrenched more deeply than other forms of law -they are harder to change. Fourth, the constitution is enforceable as law by one or more courts and is regarded as establishing a fundamental, superior domestic legal norm against which the legality of all government conduct is measured. So, to summarise, constitutions are fundamental, self-expressive, ambitiously frame-working, multi-functional, entrenched, judicially enforced and superior domestic law.
What are some of the interpretive implications of these multiple functions? Only an example can be offered. The rights-protecting function of a constitution may depend on its legitimacy within its own polity, which, in turn, may depend on the constitution's being seen as an authentic legal expression of national values; depending on particular histories, and constitutional texts, the authenticity of the constitution as a national expression may preclude a posture of convergence. On the other hand, all constitutions seek to enable good external relations with foreign countries, a goal consistent with a willingness, at least on some issues, to consider foreign or international law.
Would the task of reconciling these multiple functions of constitutions benefit from the more flexible and multi-valenced interpretive practices, like those possible through what is here called common law constitutional interpretation? Are these multiple functions more consistent with a posture of engagement, rather than convergence, with the transnational? For now, these are questions, not assertions, in what, it is hoped, will be a continuing transnational conversation. 
